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Estimating the Effect of a Retraining Program on the 
Re-Employment Rate of Displaced Workers 
 
In this paper we estimate by matching techniques the effects of a French retraining program 
on the reemployment rate of displaced workers. This program, called “Conventions de 
conversion”, was intended to improve reemployment prospects of displaced workers by 
proposing them retraining and job seeking assistance for a period of six months beginning 
just after the dismissal. Our empirical analysis is based upon non-experimental data collected 
by the French Ministry of Labour. Matching estimates show that this program succeeded in 
increasing the employment rate of trainees by approximately 6 points of percentage in the 
medium-term, namely in the second and third years after the date of entry into the program. 
This improvement is essentially due to an increase of their reemployment rate in regular jobs, 
namely jobs under long-term labour contracts. 
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 1.  Introduction 
 
Improving the effectiveness of active labour market programs (ALMPs) is a main policy 
area identified by the OECD Jobs Strategy for helping to reduce structural unemployment 
(OECD, 1994 and 1996). In an era of tight government budgets and a growing disbelief 
regarding the positive effects of ALMPs, evaluation of these programs becomes 
imperative.
1 On the one hand, the persistently high level of unemployment rates stresses 
the necessity of assistance programs in helping unemployed participants to find a job 
faster. On the other, it is often doubted whether the positive effects of active programs 
outweigh their costs. Moreover, advocates of a pessimistic perspective even argue that 
participation in such programs in periods of high unemployment may be seen as a negative 
signal for some employers and could therefore have a counter-productive impact on the 
employment performance of participants. 
 
Active labour market policies have been increasingly introduced in France since the mid-
seventies, when unemployment started to increase. These policies were targeted to workers 
with high unemployment risks, such as young people, older or displaced workers. They are 
similar to those implemented in other European countries, France being a median user. In 
France, the scope of public interventions is rather diversified. Most of the programs consist 
in providing training, job seeking support, vocational course, and adaptation training (for 
the youngest). Microeconometric studies carried out by Bonnal et al. (1997), Fougère et al. 
(2000), and Brodaty et al.(2001) have investigated the impact of such policies on 
employment prospects of young people and unskilled workers. However, few contributions 
have addressed the issue of employment programs for laid off or displaced workers
2.  
 
Our study concerns a retraining program, called “Convention de conversion”, which was 
set up in France during the eighties in order to improve labour market prospects of 
displaced workers.
3 It consists in providing an immediate and individual support to 
                                                           
1 A summary of both empirical strategies and evidence on the effects of ALMPs can be found in Heckman et 
al. (2000). In general, these studies find mixed evidence regarding the relevance of programs on both 
unemployment duration and earnings of participants. 
2 Margolis (1999) is an exception since he examines the impact of displacement on unemployment duration 
in France. However he does not evaluate the effect of active labour market programs proposed to displaced 
workers. 
3 Here displacement is defined as a layoff for economic reasons, i.e. because of a reduction in the workload 
or a lost position or a shift. This category does not include layoffs for personal reasons, such as inadequate 
performance or misconduct.  
  2displaced workers for a period of six months (beginning just after the dismissal) by 
proposing retraining and job seeking assistance. This support is granted to workers up to 
57 years old who have at least two years of seniority in their former firm. US training 
programs mainly focus on increasing the productivity and earnings of low-income 
individuals. In contrast, the main purpose of this French program is to prevent or to reduce 
unemployment by increasing the participants’ employment rates rather than their earnings. 
Thus our study boils down to the following question: do program participants manage to 
find a job, and more precisely a permanent job, faster? Hence, the outcome of interest is 
not only the re-employment probability, but also the probability to find a long-term labour 
contract. 
 
Our empirical analysis uses non-experimental data collected by the French Ministry of 
Labour from 1995 to1998. A first survey, called “Trajectoires des demandeurs d’emploi et 
marché local du travail” (“Event histories of unemployed workers and local labour 
markets”), has collected information on workers who entered unemployment between 
April and June 1995 in eight local labour markets belonging to three administrative 
regions: Paris - Ile de France, Nord - Pas de Calais, and Provence - Alpes Côte d’Azur. 
This survey has been completed by another one, called “Trajectoires des adhérents à une 
convention de conversion” (“Event histories of displaced workers participating to the 
‘Convention de conversion’ program”). This second survey was conducted in the same 
local areas with the same questionnaire, but exclusively on displaced workers joining the 
program during the same initial period. 
 
The major challenge of any evaluation study using non-experimental data is to treat the 
potential selection bias. Displaced workers who have decided to join the program might 
have individual characteristics that would be different from those who have not joined it. 
Workers participating in such a program may be less or more able to find a permanent job 
(namely, a job with a long-term labour contract) compared to otherwise identical non-
participants. The difference in post-program outcomes between participants and the control 
group of non-participants may thus reflect those individual factors rather than a causal 
effect of the program. To estimate the effect of the training program on the re-employment 
  3probability of displaced workers, we use statistical matching techniques.
4 In fact, the 
absence of valid instruments does not allow us to evaluate this effect by estimating 
parametric or semiparametric selection models. Moreover, we think that our data verify the 
three conditions put forth by Smith and Todd (2001) for a satisfying application of 
matching estimators: (i) for both groups (treated and controls), the data come from the 
same administrative source, so that outcomes are measured in an analogous way, (ii) 
participants in the program and nonparticipants reside in the same local labour markets, 
and  (iii) the data contain a sufficiently rich set of variables relevant to modelling the 
program-participation decision. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section surveys the literature on displaced 
workers. In the third section, we give a brief summary of the French institutional 
framework concerning layoffs, and then we present the main specific features of the 
retraining program that we evaluate. The fourth section presents the database. The fifth 
section presents the statistical strategy. A sixth section presents and comments the 
estimates. The last section summarizes the main results. 
 
2.  Literature review 
 
Worker displacement involves an involuntarily job separation caused by adverse economic 
conditions. In such a case, the job separation is initiated by the employer and not caused by 
the individual worker’s performance. In general displaced workers are more likely to 
experience longer unemployment spells and to incur higher search costs, including 
possibly costs involved by retraining and moving to areas with higher employment 
opportunities.  
 
Displaced workers have been the subject of an extensive literature (see surveys by Fallick, 
1996, and Kletzer, 1998). The basic stylised facts are: 1) displaced workers experience 
longer unemployment spells and higher earning losses than the other unemployed workers 
(Swaim and Podgursky, 1991, Jacobson et al., 1993); 2) the duration of the subsequent 
unemployment spell increases with job tenure (Fallick, 1996), because workers with high 
                                                           
4 Papers by Gerfin and Lechner (2002), Sianesi (2004) and Ichino et al. (2008) are good examples of the use 
of matching estimation techniques for the evaluation of active labour market policies implemented in 
European countries. 
  4tenure have a higher level of specific human capital investment in their firms and in their 
industry or occupational sectors; 3) the duration of this unemployment spell is affected by 
the cause of displacement; for instance, Swaim and Podgursky (1991) found that workers 
displaced because of plant closures experience one third fewer weeks of unemployment 
than those who are laid off by ongoing establishments. The econometric analysis 
conducted by Gibbons and Katz (1991) has shown that this result could not be attributed 
solely to differences in observable worker characteristics. These authors argued that it is 
due to a “lemon” effect: prospective employers perceive laid-off workers as being of low 
ability compared to people who lose their job due to plant closure. But, as noticed by 
Fallick (1996), “such comparisons cannot address how displacement differs from other 
potential movements into unemployment. A useful direction for future research would be 
to compare displaced workers to workers who enter unemployment in other ways – for 
example, new entrants and re-entrants to the labor force, workers who quit, workers whose 
previous job was explicitly temporary, workers who are permanently discharged for cause, 
and those who experience temporary layoffs.” 
 
In view of the difficulties the displaced workers face in achieving reinsertion, debates arise 
on the suitable policies to be undertaken. As there is little prospect of returning to a 
comparable job within a reasonable period of time (because of limited opportunities in the 
same industry, occupation or region), displaced workers may need retraining or search 
assistance. While retraining of displaced workers is not a new policy, programs to assist 
displaced workers have gained a renewed interest. In general, such programs offer job 
search assistance along with formal training. In his landmark study on displaced workers, 
Leigh (1990) concludes that job search assistance is the most cost-effective program for 
displaced workers. It also appears that training can shorten the periods of unemployment, 
but it does not affect long-term earnings. Leigh (1990) synthesizes some findings from his 
examination of labour market policies in Sweden, Germany, Japan, Great Britain and 
Australia. The main results are the following: job search assistance is relatively cheap and 
should be made freely available to those recommended by their case managers; quality 
assessment should be conducted for those wishing to join a retraining program; training 
should be locally based and characterized by decentralized decision-making to meet local 
needs more appropriately. Dar and Gill (1998), after studying eleven retraining programs 
in six countries, concluded that such programs are generally no more effective than job 
search assistance in increasing re-employment prospects. As a result, they should be 
  5targeted to those who can benefit the most from them: women and minorities (Moore, 
1990), industry-switchers (Stock, 1998), laid off workers from manufacturing (Kletzer, 
1998), or those with high tenure (Jacobson et al., 1993). In fact job search assistance and 
training appear to have some impact on the types of jobs that displaced workers obtain. 
Farber (1999, 2003) found that workers who lose their jobs are more likely to be 
reemployed in temporary jobs and, when reemployed in a permanent job, they earn 
significantly less than they did prior to their last job. Thus an obvious important 
consequence of job loss is the inability to find a new stable job.
5  
 
Despite of these negative consequences of job displacement, there are only a few studies 
evaluating the impact of long and intensive training programs on employment and wages 
of laid-off workers. For instance, Kodrzycki (1997) analyzes a sample of workers laid off 
between 1991 and 1994 who used assistance centers in Massachusetts operating under the 
provisions of the EDWAA amendment to Title III of the Job Training and Partnership Act. 
These centers offer basic readjustment services such as counselling and job market 
information to all users. In addition, some displaced workers received education and/or job 
training programs at local colleges, universities, and specialized training facilities. 
Kodrzycki (1997) restricts the sample to workers who had previously been employed full-
time and who became reemployed at a new job. First, she finds that job training only (as 
opposed to job training combined with general education classes) tended to draw the 
workers with the highest reading abilities and previous earnings, while job training 
combined with education tended to draw less promising candidates. Then, applying 
ordinary least squares to nonexperimental data, she concludes that, “even if some training 
programs can be shown to provide positive job changes that eventually result in higher job 
satisfaction or greater income for displaced workers, they may still turn out not to be 
socially beneficial.” In a more recent paper, Jacobson et al. (2005) have evaluated the 
effects of community college schooling offered to laid-off workers in the Washington 
State. This program includes a broad variety of courses, ranging from “basic skills” and 
vocational training to academic courses in math and science. Their estimates indicate 
earnings increases of 7% for males and 13% for females. The returns are up to three times 
larger for technically-oriented courses.  
                                                           
5 In 2003 in France, one year after their displacement, only 15% of laid off workers have found a new 
permanent job, 15% are occupied in temporary jobs, 10% are in training programs or pre-retired, and 60% 
are still unemployed. 
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Besides these articles focusing on programs targeted to displaced workers, there is a huge 
literature devoted to the evaluation of active labour market policies (ALMP hereafter), 
especially programs (often targeted to long-term unemployed) which offer both job-search 
assistance and intensive (re)training to participants. For instance, in a recent study, 
Stenberg and Westerlund (2008) have evaluated the effects of comprehensive adult 
education on wage earnings of Swedish long-term unemployed. Their estimates, obtained 
with propensity score matching techniques, suggest that more than one semester of study 
results in substantial increases in post program annual earnings for both males and females.  
However, several studies find that programs promoting subsidized jobs are more effective 
than those offering training or education periods. For instance, Dorsett (2006), who 
compares the effectiveness of the four options of the New Deal for Young People in the 
UK, finds that the employment option performs better than other options, namely full-time 
education and training, the voluntary sector and the environmental task force. Sianesi 
(2008) investigates the differential performance of six Swedish active labour market 
programs for the unemployed. She finds that employment subsidies perform best by far, 
followed by trainee replacement and, by a long stretch, labour market training.  More 
recently, Jespersen et al. (2008), who examine the long-term effects of Danish ALMP, 
conclude that classroom training does not significantly improve employment or earnings 
prospects in the long-run, contrary to private job training programs which have substantial 
positive effects.  
 
However, these negative results should be counterbalanced by some studies which find that 
training programs have mixed effects (see, for instance, Gerfin and Lechner, 2002, and 
Lechner et al., 2005), but also by the main conclusions of the recent meta-analysis, based 
on 97 international studies of active labour market policies, conducted by Card et al. 
(2009). Card et al. (2009) point out in particular that longer-term evaluations tend to be 
more favourable than short-term evaluations and that classroom and on-the-job training 
programs appear to be particularly likely to yield more favourable medium-term than 
short-term impact estimates. Let us remark that our study contributes to this debate since 
the program that we evaluate involves classroom training and since we focus on its 
medium-term (2
nd year) and long-term (3
rd year) effects. 
 
3.  The institutional framework 
  7 
French labour law distinguishes between layoffs for economic reasons and layoffs for 
personal reasons, such as inadequate performance or misconduct. A layoff for economic 
reason is defined as a displacement resulting from a reduction in the workload or a lost 
position or shift. This category excludes then laid-off workers due to own behaviour, but 
also quits, entries into unemployment due to the termination of a short-term labour 
contract, and new entries (or re-entries) into the labour force. This is a wider definition 
than the one proposed, for instance, by Fallick (1996) who notices that 1) displaced 
workers do not include workers fired for cause, 2) the displacement should have a 
structural cause, 3) displaced workers have a limited ability to return to a comparable job 
within a reasonable span of time, and 4) they are strongly attached to the sector in which 
they were employed. Our definition of displacement is closer to that proposed by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, which characterizes a displaced worker as someone at least 20 
years old, with at least three years of tenure on a job, who lost that job (without being 
recalled) due to slack work, abolition of a position or shift, or plant closing or relocation.  
 
During the 1990s the French labour market was characterized by numerous job losses; for 
instance, each month in 1998, on average 25,000 employees were laid off. One common 
characteristic of all layoffs for economic reasons is that employers are required to propose 
the option of participating in a retraining scheme (partially employer funded) to all 
employees who will be displaced. This clause became an actual right inscribed into the 
Labour code. The retraining program called “Convention de conversion” was introduced 
by a decree in date of 3
rd and 4
th April 1987 as a compensation for the administrative 
authorization to lay off. It was then cancelled in June 2001.  
 
The employee joining the retraining program was made redundant but was not registered 
as being actually unemployed. The initial goal of this program was to avoid long 
unemployment spells for employees who were laid off for economic reasons. It consisted 
in providing an immediate and individual support to the displaced workers for a period of 
six months beginning just after the dismissal. What were the eligibility conditions? 
Participation was voluntarily, but support was granted to workers up to 57 years old, 
having at least 2 years of seniority in the firm. Technical Units of Reinsertion (“Unités 
techniques de reclassement”) were in charge of accompanying and reinserting participants. 
They assessed the employee’s professional records and then, proposed appropriate actions 
  8including job-seeking sessions, stressing self-employment opportunities, on-the-job 
assessment and extra training (computer, accounting, management, languages, etc…). The 
benefit of extra education and support in job seeking throughout the program was meant to 
reduce the subsequent unemployment spell and more generally to improve the conditions 
of reinsertion into the labour market. During the first two months of the program, the 
worker received a specific allowance representing 83% of his or her previous wage. This 
percentage fell down to 70% during the four following months. 
 
Statistics published by the French Ministry of Labour show that, since 1997, the gap 
between the number of workers who joined the program and the number that is potentially 
entitled to join has been closing. Indeed, throughout the first semester of 1999, 84.7% of 
the eligible workers joined it, while they were only 79.1% in 1996 (which was already a 
peak
6 due to the important number of layoffs that year).  
 
4.  The data 
 
The estimation is carried out using data coming from two surveys collected by the French 
Ministry of Labour, in collaboration with the Agence Nationale Pour l’Emploi (ANPE 
hereafter), which is the French public employment service, and the Union Nationale pour 
l’Emploi Dans l’Industrie et le Commerce (UNEDIC hereafter), which is the institution in 
charge of the payment of unemployment insurance benefits in France. Information used in 
our study comes from these two surveys. For instance, at each interview, workers are asked 
about their seniority in the previous job, about their employment status in the second or the 
third year after entry into the program, etc. The answers, especially those concerning the 
unemployment or employment status at each date, are compared (and eventually set in 
accordance) with the information coming from the ANPE and UNEDIC administrative 
files. In our opinion, this procedure limits the potential problem of non-random 
misreporting. 
 
The first one, called “Trajectoires des demandeurs d’emploi et marché local du travail”, 
contains information on a random sample of workers entering unemployment between 
April and June 1995 in three French administrative regions (Paris-Ile-de-France, 
                                                           
6 There were 148,492 new recipients of this program in 1996, which corresponds to an increase of 11.2% for 
the number of participants between 1995 and 1996. 
  9Provence–Alpes-Côte d’Azur, and Nord-Pas-de-Calais). Indeed, these surveys are not 
representative of all the regions in France. These workers were interviewed at three dates, 
until May 1998. This first survey has been completed by another one, called “Trajectoires 
des adhérents à une convention de conversion”, held in the same conditions and with 
similar questionnaires, but collected on workers joining the program at the same date. The 
originality of these surveys lies thus in the fact that individuals are randomly sampled in 
the inflows of displaced workers either joining the retraining program after dismissal or 
entering unemployment (without joining the program) during a given time interval. As a 
consequence, unemployment duration is not left censored. 
 
To evaluate the causal effect of the program, one has to contrast the situation of individuals 
after program participation with the counterfactual situation in the absence of participation. 
Because the latter situation is not observable, it needs to be estimated based on the 
outcome of other individuals who do not participate, the so called control group. When 
choosing or constructing this control group, different adjustment procedures may be 
applied to ensure that participants and controls are identical with respect to all relevant 
characteristics except that of not participating. In experimental evaluations, the 
construction of an adequate control group is done by means of randomisation. When non-
experimental data are used, failure to take into account for discrepancies between 
participants and controls may lead to substantially biased judgements regarding the effect 
of the program. Here one has drawn the control group from the first survey in order to 
control for eligibility conditions at first stage. The control group is then only composed of 
individuals potentially entitled to join the program, which means that they respect the 
following imposed criteria used when applying to the program: they are under 57 years 
old, they are displaced and have at least two years of seniority in their previous firm. The 
whole sample, including both sub-samples (participants and non-participants), includes 
1,912 observations. The date from which the effect of the retraining program is measured 
is chosen to be either the date of entry into the program for trainees, and the date of entry 
into the sampled unemployment spell for controls.
7 This approach is valid since the treated 
enter the program immediately after being laid off. Otherwise, bias might arise by the fact 
                                                           
7 After layoff, the trainees are not registered as unemployed. Empirical evidence shows that, in general, the 
time spent in a training program is principally devoted to training (see, for instance, Lalive et al., 2000). 
Fitzenberger et al. (2009) show that, despite the lock-in effect resulting from the participation period, some 
programs may still have significant positive effects on employment rates in the medium and long run. These 
results confirm those previously obtained by Lechner (2004). 
  10that the most successful dismissed workers immediately find a job and only the 
unsuccessful ones finally decide to enter the program. At the program start, this population 
would not necessarily be comparable to the inflow into unemployment. 
 
Descriptive statistics for the two sub-samples (participants and non-participants) are 
displayed in the appendix (Table A.1). The sub-sample of participants contains higher 
proportions of older workers with higher seniority (more than 10 years). Among the 1,010 
participants, 130 move directly from the program to a permanent job and 164 directly to a 
temporary job. The 716 remaining enter unemployment at the end of the program. Among 
these unemployed participants, 189 moved to a permanent job, 156 found a temporary job, 
the others 371 are either still unemployed at the end of the observation period, either in 
training or inactivity. Among the 920 unemployed non-participants, 166 have found a 
permanent job and 236 a temporary labour contract. In fact, roughly 32% of participants 
have obtained a permanent job (either directly at the end of the program or after the 
unemployment spell following program participation). Conversely, only 18% of non-
participants have moved from unemployment to a permanent job. It seems that 
participation in the program increases the frequency of transitions to regular (permanent) 
employment. However, these crude statistics could be subject to a composition bias due to 
the individual heterogeneity of both subgroups. The statistical approach conducted in the 
next sections allows us to control for this heterogeneity. 
 
5.  Matching estimators 
 
Evaluation methods usually try to compare two potential outcomes which are associated 
with two regimes, generally called “treatment” and “non-treatment”. The regime is 
indicated by the value of a dummy variable D, which takes value 1 in the treatment regime 
and value 0 in the non-treatment case. Treatment is associated with an individual outcome 
denoted Y1 while non-treatment generates an outcome denoted Y0. Moreover X denote pre-
treatment characteristics verifying the conditional independence assumption (CIA 
hereafter) which is required for implementing matching estimation techniques. This 
assumption states that : 
()X D Y Y C 1 0, , ∀ X 
  11This assumption means in particular that selection into the program (i.e. the treatment 
regime) is only based on observable characteristics and that all covariates affecting 
simultaneously assignment to treatment and potential outcomes are observed by the 
analyst. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown that the CIA assumption implies that:  
() ( ) X P D Y Y C 1 0, , ∀ X 
where the propensity score  () ( ) ( ) X D E X D X P = = = 1 Pr  must verify that 0 < P(X) < 1, ∀ 
X. This last condition means that all individuals with the same X have the same probability 
to be treated or non-treated, and that a match can be found for all D = 1 persons. The CIA 
assumption also implies that the propensity score P(X) is balancing, namely: 
( ) X P X DC , ∀ X 
This last property can help in determining which interactions and higher order terms to 
include for a given set of bqca covariates in the propensity score model (say, a logit or a 
probit model), even if it does not aid to choose which variables X to include. In particular, 
it implies that, if after conditioning on the estimated values of Pr(D = 1 | X) there is still 
dependence on X, the model used to estimate Pr(D = 1 | X) could be misspecified.  
Under these assumptions, the average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT) can be 
written as: 
()
() () () {}
() () () {} X P D Y E E D Y E
X P D Y E E D Y E









= − = =




where the first term can be estimated from the treatment group and the second term from 
the average outcome of those persons in the comparison group who are matched on P(X). 
Equivalently, the average effect of the treatment on the untreated (ATU) can be written as:  
()
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The average treatment effect (ATE) for a randomly chosen individual is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 Pr 0 1 Pr 1 0 1 0 1 = × = − + = × = − = D D Y Y E D D Y Y E ATE  
All matching estimators of the ATT parameter take the form: 
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and where I1 denotes the set of participants, I0 the set of nonparticipants, SP the region of 
common support, and n1 the number of persons in the set I1 ∩ S P. The counterfactual 
expectation for each individual i∈(I1 ∩ S P) is estimated as a weighted average over the 
outcomes of nonparticipants, the weight W(i, j) depending on the distance between the 
estimated propensity scores of individuals i and j, denoted   and   respectively.  i P j P
Let C(Pi) denote a neighbourhood of the propensity score of individual i belonging to the 
participant sample. The neighbours of participant i are nonparticipants j whose score Pj 
belongs to C(Pi). Matched nonparticipants belong to the subset Ai = {j ∈ I0 | Pj∈C(Pi)}. 
Alternative matching estimators differ in how the neighbourhood C(Pi) and the weights 
W(i, j) are defined. 




i P P P C − = min , j ∈ I0









i. Typically, the nonparticipant with the value of   that is closest to 
 is selected for matching and A
j P
i P i is a singleton set ( ). Implementation of this 
estimator does not impose any common support condition. In the case without 





Caliper matching imposes a tolerance on the maximum distance  j i P P −  allowed. More 
precisely, a match for individual i is selected only if  j i P P −  < ε, j ∈ I0, where ε is a pre-
specified tolerance. Here the neighbourhoods are : 
() { } ε < − = j i j i P P P P C , j ∈ I0
Dehejia and Wahba (2002) have proposed a variant of caliper matching, called radius 
caliper matching, in which the counterfactual is calculated as the mean outcome of all 
nonparticipants within the caliper (namely, belonging to the subset Ai), rather than just the 
closest neighbour.
8
                                                            
8 In our application, the tolerance ε is set equal to 0.06. 
  13The kernel matching estimator constructs a match for each program participant by using a 




























































where G(.) is a kernel function and an is a bandwidth parameter. Here the weights are 
defined by: 
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j i W  
and the neighbourhood C(Pi) depends on the specific kernel function that is chosen. 
In our application, we produce these three types of matching estimates by using the 
STATA modules psmatch2 (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003) and pscore (Becker and Ichino, 
2002). Since the samples used in our evaluation are choice-based with program 
participants oversampled, we match on the odds ratio P/(1-P), as suggested by Smith and 
Todd (2005, p. 319).
9
 
6.  Results 
 
6.1  Validity of the matching procedure 
 
Before implementing the matching procedure, we must argue about its validity in our 
context. For that purpose, we first need to detail the process through which workers may 
have access to the program. In principle, each employer firing workers for economic 
reasons, whatever their number and their wages, should  propose to these workers to 
participate in the program.
10 More precisely, the employer must notify the employees 
concerned by registered mail (with acknowledgement of receipt) the proposal to participate 
                                                            
9 Estimates obtained by matching on the propensity score P are close to those obtained by matching on the 
odds ratio. They are not reproduced but are available from the authors. 
10 Workers laid-off for personal reasons, such as inadequate performance or misconduct, cannot participate in 
the program. It is thus possible that some employers could have been tempted to transform layoffs for 
economic reasons into layoffs for personal reasons. 
  14in the program, with the photocopy of the agreement the firm has signed with the State (i.e. 
with the local representatives of the Ministry of Labour). In this letter, the employer must 
also detail the re-employment possibilities of the laid-off workers within the firm (for 
instance, after participation in the program). However, the employer is not constrained to 
choose this option. If he/she decides not to propose the program to the laid-off workers, 
he/she has to pay to the ASSEDIC (which is the institution in charge of raising 
unemployment insurance contributions in France) a penalty whose amount is equal to one 
monthly gross wage for each laid-off worker. Consequently it is likely that firms with 
sufficiently “deep pockets” (in particular, the biggest ones) could be more willing to pay 
the penalty. This argument leads us to control for the size of the firm when choosing the 
regressors incorporated into the propensity score model.
11 When layoffs result from a plant 
closing, the employer has probably much more difficulties to detail the possibilities of 
future re-employment within another plant (if the firm has several plants). Moreover, in the 
case of a plant closing, it is generally more difficult to organize a program session because 
of the limited capacity of training centres. These last arguments could explain why the 
occurrence of a plant closing makes the participation in the program less likely. 
 
Participation in the program is not mandatory. The worker has three weeks from the receipt 
of the employer’s letter in which he may accept (or eventually refuse) the proposal to 
participate in the program. Nevertheless, he/she has strong incentives to participate: during 
the program, he/she receives an allowance equal to 83.4% of his/her previous wage in the 
first two months, and then equal to 70.4% of this wage as from the third month. For 
comparison, if he/she refuses to participate and enters unemployment after his/her layoff, 
the amount of his/her UI benefit is equal to 57.4% of his/her previous wage. Moreover, if 
he/she does not finds a new job at the end of the program (which generally lasts six 
months), he/she is still eligible to UI (with the usual UI replacement ratio), and the length 
of his/her overall period of eligibility to UI is only reduced by two months and a half. 
Thus, for explaining why the worker may not enter the program, we have to control for the 
determinants that influence both his/her decision to join the program as well as his/her 
future labour market performance.  
 
Like in previous studies using matching techniques for the evaluation of ALMPs (see, for 
instance, Lechner et al., 2005, Sianesi, 2008, Stenberg and Westerlund, 2008, Jespersen et 
                                                            
11 Unfortunately, we have no information on the market value of the firm (like its profit or its market share). 
  15al., 2008, and Fitzenberger et al., 2009), we control for a whole list of variables 
characterizing the worker’s past employment history as well as his/her current employment 
prospects. In our dataset, several variables describe the worker’s past history: his/her 
potential labour market experience, the number of unemployment spells that he/she 
previously experienced, the duration of his/her longest previous unemployment spell, and 
his/her seniority within the firm. Demographic factors such as age, gender, number of 
children in the household and citizenship, are also important determinants of the labour 
market prospects. Information about individual human capital is available through 
variables indicating the educational level (college and above) and the professional category 
(unskilled or skilled blue-collar worker, white-collar worker, intermediate profession, 
executive). Variability of the local socioeconomic contexts is restricted here since we 
consider only eight local labour markets belonging to three administrative regions. 
However, to control for the remaining differences in terms of unemployment rate and of 
labour demand across these eight labour markets, we take into account the value of the 
unemployment/vacancy ratio U/V defined as the number of unemployed persons divided 
by the number of vacant jobs in the local labour market where the individual lives. The 
participation in the program being voluntary, its evaluation by a matching procedure 
(based on the conditional independence assumption and on the hypothesis of selection on 
observables) could be subject to a motivation bias, which could still be present after 
controlling for the whole list of observable variables that we have presented.
12 When 
discussing the results, we should keep in mind this problem which possibly produces an 
overestimation of the average treatment effect. 
 
6.2  The propensity score 
 
The first step of the statistical analysis consists in estimating the probability to participate 
in the program. The set of control variables affecting this probability includes individual 
characteristics such as age, gender, marital status, number of children, education, 
nationality (French citizenship or not), and characteristics of the previous job such as its 
skill level, the size of the firm, the seniority in this job, and the reason for the layoff (plant 
closing or not).
13 We also include in this list some indicators of the local labour market 
                                                            
12 If motivation affects both the probability to work and to enter the program, the treatment effect could be 
confounded by unobservables. 
13 We tried to robustify the specification of the selection model by including interaction terms (for instance, 
between gender and the number of children, between gender and age, etc.) and the past employment history 
  16conditions. For that purpose, in a first specification, we incorporate the ratio Uj /V defined 
as the number of unemployed persons of type j divided by the number of vacanbs in the 
local labour market where the individual lives. The value of this ratio is taken either at the 
date of entry into the program (for trainees) or at the date of entry into the unemployment 
spell (for controls). For constructing the numbers Uj of unemployed persons, we consider 
six socio-demographic groups (j = 1,…,6), each gender being split into three age groups 
(less than 30, between 30 and 49, 50 and more). In an alternative model, these ratios are 
simply replaced by indicators of the region of residence. The probability to participate in 
the retraining program is assumed to be generated by a logit model whose parameter 
estimates are reported in Table 1a. This table reveals that parameter estimates are quite 
similar under both specifications (in model 1 with Uj /V variables, and in model 2 with 
regional dummies).  
 
First, we observe that the probability to join the program is lower for women, foreigners 
(non-French citizens), persons having at least three children, blue-collar workers, and for 
workers previously employed in a firm with more than 200 employees. Conversely, this 
probability is significantly higher for young workers (less than 25 years old), executives, 
those who incurred a collective layoff not associated with a plant closure, and for those 
who stayed more than three years in the previous firm. The ratio of the number of young 
unemployed workers over the number of vacancies in the local labour market has a 
significant effect on the probability of entering the program. However, this effect has 
opposite signs for both genders. The probability of participating in the retraining program 
increases with the relative number of young unemployed men, while it decreases with the 
relative number of young unemployed women. The same contrast is observed for the 
tightness ratios concerning older unemployed workers, but the associated parameter 
estimates are statistically significant at the 10%-level only. Model 2 reveals that the 
probability to participate in the retraining program is statistically higher in the Nord-Pas-
de-Calais region. The region of common support calculated by the STATA module pscore 
appears to be large and similar for both specifications (see the last line in Table 1a). The 
numbers of deleted observations due to the common support condition are shown in Table 
                                                                                                                                                                                
(for instance, the number of unemployment spells prior to the last job, and the duration of the longest 
previous unemployment spell) as additional covariates. None of these interaction terms or additional 
covariates (except the duration of the longest previous unemployment spell) appears to be statistically 
significant. However, when introducing the duration of the longest previous unemployment spell in the 
  171b; these numbers are quite low. Figures 1 and 2 represent the distributions of propensity 
scores estimated in each group (treated and non-treated) with models 1 and 2, respectively. 
These distributions look alike, except in the lower (respectively, upper) tail of the 
distribution since low (respectively, high) values of the estimated propensity score are 
more frequent for non-treated (respectively, treated) individuals.  
 
Propensity scores estimated with models 1 and 2 verify the balancing property (according 
to tests implemented with STATA modules psmatch2 and pscore). However this is not the 
case for the estimated propensity score resulting from the more general logit model in 
which ratios Uj  /V  and region dummies are simultaneously introduced as regressors. 
Consequently, matching estimates that are reported hereafter are those obtained with the 
propensity score resulting from model 1 (with ratios Uj /V). Matching estimates deduced 
from model 2 are quite similar.
14
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
propensity score, the balancing score property is no longer verified. Consequently, this additional variable 
has been finally excluded from the list of regressors affecting the selection equation. 
14 They are not reported here, but are available from the authors. 
  18Table 1a 
Estimated parameters of the propensity score (logit models) 
 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Variables  Parameter  Standard Error  Parameter  Standard error 
Intercept  -2.1205 0.3433***  -2.0636 0.2500*** 
Mass layoff without plant closure   0.4898  0.1137***   0.4821  0.1131*** 
Woman  -0.2514 0.1248*  -0.2446 0.1243* 
Less than 25 years old   0.4921  0.2798   0.4440  0.2805 
Three children and more  -0.4772  0.1484***  -0.5110  0.1473*** 
Education: college and above   0.4406  0.1642**   0.3954  0.1630** 
Foreigner (no French citizenship)  -0.3018 0.1452*  -0.2649 0.1438 
White-collar worker   0.2665  0.1454   0.2997  0.1450* 
High-skilled worker   0.3495 0.1640*    0.3753 0.1628* 
Executive, top-manager   0.4287 0.2246*    0.4814 0.2236* 
Seniority between 3 and 5 years   1.6228  0.1872***   1.6081  0.1859*** 
Seniority higher than 5 years   1.6932  0.1778***   1.6985  0.1767*** 
Firm  size:       
- less than 50 employees   0.6999  0.1489***   0.7226  0.1479*** 
- between 50 and 100 employees   0.5526  0.2009**   0.6067  0.1997** 
- between 100 and 200 employees   0.3908  0.2267   0.4631  0.2252* 
Ratios Uj/ V :       
- males below 30 years old   0.6104  0.2108**     
- males above 50 years old   1.8754  1.0424     
- females below 30 years old  -0.6750  0.2479**     
- females above 50 years old  -2.6068  1.6466     
Region of residence:         
- Nord - Pas de Calais       0.2788  0.1344* 
- Ile-de-France       0.0420  0.1260 
Log - likelihood  -1 055.14  -1 062.99 
Number of observations   1,912   1,912 
Region of common support  [0.1260154, 0.87726554]  [0.1132257, 0.87044135] 
 




Numbers of deleted observations due to the common support requirement  
 
  Before matching  After matching  Deleted 
 All  Treated  Untreated  All  Treated  Untreated  All 
Model 1  1,689  728  961  1,686  725  961  0.18% 
Model 2  1,689  728  961  1,673  712  961  0.95% 
 
  19Figure 1 
Distributions of propensity scores estimated with model 1 
 







Distributions of propensity scores estimated with model 2 
 





  206.3. Matching estimates 
 
The first outcome that we consider is the proportion of time spent in employment during 
the second and third years after the entry into the program (for the trainees) and into 
unemployment (for controls).
15 The results are reported in Tables 2. All tables give various 
matching estimates, obtained with different matching techniques: nearest-neighbour 
matching (without replacement), radius caliper matching, and kernel matching, this last 
method being implemented with three different kernel functions (Gaussian, biweight, and 
uniform). At each date, three average effects have been estimated with each matching 
method:  
•  the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), or equivalently, the average 
effect of the program for the workers who actually participate in this program, 
•  the average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU), or equivalently, the average 
effect of the program for those who do not participate in the program, 
•  the average treatment effect (ATE), or equivalently, the average effect of the 
program for a randomly chosen laid-off worker. 
 
The matching estimates are always statistically different from zero, at least at the 1% level 
of significance, and they indicate that the retraining program increases the proportion of 
time spent in employment by approximately 6.5 points during the second year and by 
approximately 5.7 points of percentage during the third year after the date of entry into the 
program. These estimated effects are similar for trainees and controls. Consequently, the 
estimated average effect for the whole sample has the same value. 
 
As noticed in the introduction, Farber (1999, 2003) found that workers who lose their jobs 
are more likely to be reemployed in temporary jobs.
16 Thus it is particularly important to 
assess whether the retraining program help workers who participate to find a permanent 
job (namely, a job with a long-term labour contract) compared to otherwise identical non-
participants. Consequently, we have also used matching techniques to estimate the effect of 
the retraining program on the proportion of time spent in regular employment during the 
                                                            
15 Unfortunately the information about wages in this data set is too imprecise to consider the post-training 
wage level as the relevant outcome. 
16 This feature is crucial in a country like France where, according to Blanchard and Landier (2002), fixed-
duration labour contracts have substantially increased turnover, without a substantial reduction in 
unemployment duration.  
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nd and 3
rd years after entry into the program.
17 Tables 3 contain the results of this exercise. 
They show that the retraining program has increased the time that the trainees have spent 
in regular employment by approximately 8 points of percentage during the 2
nd year and by 
an amount between 5.5, and 6 points during the 3
rd year. Thus, the increase in their 
reemployment rate is due to an increase of their reemployment probability in regular jobs, 
namely jobs under long-term contracts the increase.
18 The time spent in regular 
employment would have also increased for non-participants, by approximately 7.5 points 
of percentage during the 2
nd year and by 5.7 during the 3
rd year. 
 
In a further analysis, we have compared the estimated effects of the program for different 
subgroups. More precisely, we have conducted the analysis by distinguishing genders, skill 
levels (two categories: white-collars, skilled workers and executives on one side, and blue-
collar workers on the other) and age (three age groups). Outcome is the time spent in 
employment in the 2
nd and 3
rd years after the date of entry into the program. Results are 
reported in Tables 4, 5, 6a and 6b. First, matching estimates show that, in terms of this 
outcome, the retraining program is principally beneficial for men (Tables 4) and for adult 
workers between 30 and 50 years old (see Tables 6a and 6b). Within these categories, both 
trainees and non-trainees have, or would have, benefited from their participation in the 
program. This result could mean that the program has been mainly beneficial (and possibly 
better adapted) to the displaced workers with a higher labour market experience. This 
interpretation is in line with the conclusion of the study conducted by Kodrzycki (1997) 
who observes that, in the case of job training programs proposed to displaced workers in 
Massachusetts in the early nineties, “different types of training are used by different types 
of displaced workers and have different degrees of effectiveness”: relatively short training 
programs (i.e. less than one year) which consist mainly in vocational training benefit 
mainly to workers with a higher ability and a longer work history, while training 
combining vocational and general education, which corresponds generally to longer 
programs (i.e. more than one year), is better adapted to workers with lower past 
                                                            
17 In our study, permanent jobs correspond to long-term labour contracts. Fixed-term contracts, temporary 
agency work and subsidized jobs are excluded from this category. The limited size of our sample prevents us 
to do a more precise analysis by distinguishing other categories such as full-time jobs versus part-time jobs. 
The distinction between permanent jobs versus temporary jobs appears to be relevant in order to examine the 
average quality of the corresponding jobs. For instance, in 1996, which is the median year of our survey, the 
average net monthly wage of workers occupied in permanent jobs was equal to 10,170 French francs, and 87 
% among them worked full-time; the same year, the average net monthly wage of workers occupied in 
temporary jobs was equal to 6,810 French francs, and 69 % only were employed full-time (source: “Enquête 
sur l’emploi”, INSEE, Paris, 1996). 
  22experience. Finally, let us remark that, in the 3
rd year after entry, women who have been 
retrained spend more time in employment (4 percentage points more), but those who do 
not participate would have also gained (by the same amount). For the two skill groups that 
we consider (blue-collars vs. white-collars, high-skilled workers and executives), estimated 
effects of the program are statistically significant, but they are quite similar (see Tables 5). 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
  23Tables 2 
Matching estimates of the effect of the retraining program on the time spent in employment 
 
 















































Remarks: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported between parentheses. ATT is the average 
treatment effect on the treated. ATU is the average treatment effect on the untreated. ATE is 



















































Remarks: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported between parentheses. ATT is the average 
treatment effect on the treated. ATU is the average treatment effect on the untreated. ATE is 
the average treatment effect. Sample sizes: 699 trainees, 572 controls. 
 
  24Tables 3 
Matching estimates of the effect of the retraining program on the time spent in regular 
employment (in long-term labour contracts) 
 















































Remarks: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported between parentheses. ATT is the average 
treatment effect on the treated. ATU is the average treatment effect on the untreated. ATE is 



















































Remarks: Bootstrapped standard errors are reported between parentheses. ATT is the average 
treatment effect on the treated. ATU is the average treatment effect on the untreated. ATE is 
the average treatment effect. Sample sizes: 699 trainees, 572 controls. 
  25Tables 4 
Matching estimates of the effect of the retraining program on the time spent employment (by 
gender) 
Outcome: proportion of time spent in employment during the 2
nd year 
 

























































































Outcome: proportion of time spent in employment during the 3
rd year 
 

























































































Remarks: In each table, bootstrapped standard errors are reported between parentheses. ATT is 
the average treatment effect on the treated. ATU is the average treatment effect on the 
untreated. ATE is the average treatment effect. 
  26Tables 5 
Matching estimates of the effect of the program on the time spent in employment (by skill level) 
Proportion of time spent in employment during the 2
nd year 
 

























































































Proportion of time spent in employment during the 3
rd year 
 

























































































Remarks: In each table, bootstrapped standard errors are reported between parentheses. ATT is 
the average treatment effect on the treated. ATU is the average treatment effect on the 
untreated. ATE is the average treatment effect. 
  27Tables 6a 
Matching estimates of the effect of the program on the time spent in employment (by age) 
 
















































































































































Remarks: In each table, bootstrapped standard errors are reported between parentheses. ATT is 
the average treatment effect on the treated. ATU is the average treatment effect on the 
untreated. ATE is the average treatment effect. 
  28Tables 6b 
Matching estimates of the effect of the program on the time spent in employment (by age) 
 
















































































































































Remarks: In each table, bootstrapped standard errors are reported between parentheses. ATT is 
the average treatment effect on the treated. ATU is the average treatment effect on the 
untreated. ATE is the average treatment effect. 
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7.  Concluding remarks 
 
The aim of this article was to estimate the impact of a retraining program targeted to 
displaced workers on their return to permanent employment. This program, called 
“Convention de conversion”, was set up in France during the eighties. It consisted in 
providing an immediate and individual support to displaced workers for a period of six 
months (beginning just after the dismissal) by proposing retraining and job seeking 
assistance. Our matching estimates show that this program succeeded in increasing the 
employment rate of trainees by approximately 6 points of percentage in the medium-term, 
namely in the second and third years after the date of entry into the program. This 
improvement is essentially due to an increase of their employment rate in regular jobs (i.e. 
jobs under long-term labour contracts). This last result is particular important since Farber 
(1999, 2003) noticed that, in the absence of any intervention, displaced workers are more 
likely to be reemployed in temporary jobs. We have also found that this French retraining 
program has been principally beneficial for adult workers between 30 and 50 years old, i.e. 
for the displaced workers with a higher labour market experience. Consequently, a longer 
program, combining intensively general and vocational education, could have been more 
beneficial for displaced workers with the shortest work histories. 
 
Our findings confirm and complement two sets of previous results: 
•  First, intensive (re)training programs designed for laid-off workers have positive 
effects not only their subsequent wages (see, for instance, Jacobson et al., 2005, 
and Stenberg and Westerlund, 2008), but also on their employment rates, and 
especially on their employment rate in regular jobs (with long-term labour 
contracts); 
•  Second, these programs, like some other active labour market programs (see, for 
instance, Lechner, 2004, Jespersen et al., 2008, and Fitzenberger et al., 2009, for 
other examples), have medium- and long-run effects on the employment rate of 
trainees. 
 
In a further research, it would be worthwhile to focus on the effectiveness of retraining 
programs proposed to displaced workers laid off from shrinking industries (for instance, 
traditional manufacturing industries). In particular, it should been assessed whether such 
  30workers (in particular, the oldest ones) need longer training programs, with a higher 
content in terms of general (and possibly vocational) education, and whether such 
programs help them to change occupations. In economies with changing job opportunities, 
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Descriptive statistics for non-participants and participants (percentages) 
 
  Non – participants  Participants 
Individual characteristics     
Between 16 and  25 years old   3.86  416 
Between 26 and 39 years old  29.93  27.78 
Between 40 and 49 years old  54.01  56.03 
50 years old and more  10.2  14.05 
Women 44.62  46.43 
Foreigner (no French citizenship)  19.86  14.05 
One child  22.95  23.14 
Two children  22.10  26.07 
Three children and more  18.50  12.60 
Region of residence    
Paris-Ile-de-France 35.17  32.88 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 29.24  34.03 
Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur   35.59  33.09 
Educational level    
Primary education   12.97  13.01 
Junior high-school  13.79  10.61 
Upper high-school  8.83  7.80 
Professional school  42.48  41.31 
College 8.00  8.84 
University 13.93  18.42 
Tenure in the previous job    
Between 2 and 3 years  21.93  6.04 
Between 3 and 5 years  25.52  30.80 
Between 5 and 10 years  52.55  63.16 
Skill level in the previous job    
Unskilled blue-collar worker  22.76  17.07 
Skilled blue-collar worker  22.62  21.85 
White-collar worker  32.69  33.30 
High-skilled worker  14.76  18.02 
Manager 7.17  9.78 
Reason for layoff    
Mass layoff without plant closure  69.24  70.76 
Mass layoff with plant closure  30.76  29.24 
Firm size (previous job)    
Less than 50 employees  62.48  65.97 
Between 50 and 99 employees  10.90  12.59 
Between 100 and 199 employees 7.45  7.80 
More than 200 employees  19.17  13.63 
Number of observations  728 961 
 
Source: French Ministry of Labour 
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